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VOLUNTARY PLANT CLOSINGS AND WORKFORCE
REDUCTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Professor R. Blanpain*
The mood of the times in which our industrialized systems evolve
is clearly illustrated by comments made by the United States Secretary
of Commerce, Mr. Baldridge, who at an OECD meeting in Venice
in April of this year made a blistering attack on European
industrial relations policies. He said that one of the reasons that
European companies lag behind their counterparts in the United States
was the existence of powerful barriers to reducing or even to moving
the workforce. American companies, he said, are more willing to
hire workers because they can dismiss them if things go wrong. This
statement, I think, illustrates the mood of the times.
Fifteen years ago when a company closed in Belgium, almost
everyone protested because closing down was almost unheard of.
How could one close down? But five years ago we were merely raising
our eyebrows. Now reorganizations, including plant closings, are
considered normal. Moreover, a company which is neither reorgan-
izing nor reshuffling is considered to have incompetent management.
These days management is supposed to do things - to reorganize,
to restructure, and so on. The exercise is called "positive adjustment."
Those who "positively adjust" are considered to be winners; those
who do not are losers and, so the saying goes, Europe is losing
because in Europe powerful barriers hinder readjusting, reducing,
and moving the workforce.
I will deal with the international labor law scenery as it relates to
the ILO and the OECD, and I too will go a bit beyond 1982.' Mr.
Yemin does not discuss the international scenery at any depth or any
length in his book. I am not, however, going to discuss the European
Communities since eminent representatives of European Communities
are present here.
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As far as the International Labour Organization is concerned,
developments are in a sense, given the mood of the times, rather
amazing. The ILO adopted an important convention on termination
of the employment contract; part 3 of that convention is particularly
important. In a sense, it is amazing that this convention was accepted
in 1982. I will also refer to the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 19772
and the OECD Guidelines of 19763, both concerning multinational
enterprises. It is essential to emphasize that both international in-
struments, which are addressed to multinational enterprises, apply to
national companies as well. This means that in countries such as the
United States which lack legislation comparable to what exists in
many European countries, for example concerning closures or col-
lective dismissals, American trade-unions and workers could very
fruitfully refer to those instruments when no notice of closure or
dismissals is given, or when no consultations have taken place, and
consequently engage in follow up procedures.
I will discuss first the restriction of the managerial rights, second
relations with worker representatives, and third, relations with public
authorites. Regarding restrictions on managerial rights, I can be rather
short. The international instruments contain a declaration of intent
regarding job security. Employers should, the international instru-
ments indicate, if possible, provide stable employment; parties should
seek to avoid or minimize dismissals as much as possible. There is
evidently no restriction, though, of the right to close down or to
effectuate workforce reductions. The issue of the right of management
to close down was, however, discussed at the occasion of a Dutch
case, which was introduced by the Dutch Government in the OECD's
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises committee
(IME). Batco-Amsterdam was alleged to be a local profitmaking unit
and when Batco wanted to close down the Amsterdam plant the
question arose whether it was acceptable under the OECD Guidelines
to close a profit-making unit of an enterprise. The IMC committee
was of the opinion that the potential for profit-making is difficult
to assess and clarified that the OECD Guidelines do not intend to
freeze certain given situations. According to the committee, multi-
national enterprise can close a subsidiary, even a profitable one, but
2 International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Con-
cerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted Nov. 16, 1977, reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978).
3Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Enterprises, annexed to Declaration of 21 June, 1976 by Governments of
OECD Member Countries on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
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should in doing so consider national objectives. For instance, if the
enterprise had promised to create jobs, then it should consider whether
it should live up to its promise.
Second, I should discuss relations with workers and worker rep-
resentatives. Worker representatives are entitled to information and
consultation - for example, information on reason for closure or
dismissals, on numbers, when termination will take place, and so on.
The most important question is obviously, when. Workers are not
so much interested in the history of the enterprise, but rather want
to influence coming decisions as the ILO says, "in good time," or
as the ILO recommendation says, "as early as possible." The OECD
Guidelines recommend giving reasonable notice. The OECD's IME
committee clarified in the Badger case that "as early as possible."
means before a decision is made, except when this would be impossible
for imperative reasons of business confidentiality. But consult on
what? Well, rarely on the decision itself, but mostly on the conse-
quences. The consultation should address ways to avoid dismissals,
if possible, and otherwise on ways to mitigate their adverse effects.
The conclusion is clear: the international instruments do not restrict
managerial rights, but there is a duty to inform worker representatives
in advance and a general rule to consult on the effects.
A related problem concerns the access of employees to represen-
tatives of management who are entitled to make decisions. The OECD
discussed this in connection with the Viggo case. Viggo is a subsidiary
of a British multinational based in London. Viggo wanted to reor-
ganize. The local employer started to negotiate, but the union insisted
on bargaining with top management. Real decisions, they said, were
made in London; therefore the unions wanted to negotiate at that
level. The OECD clarified the relevant OECD Guideline by saying
that there are various methods by which employees can have access
to decisionmakers under paragraph 9 of the Employment chapter of
the OECD Guidelines. The OECD said basically this: management
can do three things, it can delegate authority to the local manager
who then becomes a decisionmaker, it can send someone from the
top to join the local bargaining team, it can have direct relations
between headquarters and local employees. In the Ford Motor case
- closure of Ford Amsterdam - the question was raised whether
employees are entitled to consult with representatives of management
who have authority to make decisions on ways to avert or mitigate
adverse effects of closures. The IME committee said that employees
are entitled to consult with decisionmakers as well.
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Another problem is one of the greatest importance. In the Badger
case (Badger-Antwerp-Belgium) a subsidiary went bankrupt because
it did not have enough money to pay for the compensation legally
due employees in case of closure. The OECD's clarification given in
connection with that case implies that if the relevant decisions are
made at the top, that is if there is centralized management so that
the local unit is not really autonomous, top management should take
responsibility for the consequences at the local level, and in this case
pay the compensation for dismissed employees.
The OECD has also discussed "languages." In that case, a leading
multinational bank allegedly refused to negotiate in Danish in Den-
mark. The OECD suggested that employees should be informed,
consulted, and be entitled to negotiate in a language they effectively
understand. Otherwise, interpretation should be provided.
If I may summarize, managerial freedom remains full, provided
information is given beforehand and consultation on the consequences
takes place in good time, and provided there is access to decision-
makers, with possible co-responsibility of the parent for the debts of
the subsidiary.
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